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Beyond the Bounds of Decency: Why Fault




Wrongs Committed During a Marriage: The Child that No Area of the
Law Wants to Adopt,' by Michelle Evans, does a fabulous job of unpacking the
problems with trying to account for wrongs in a marriage outside of the divorce
proceeding. These range from the "who goes first" problem of whether and
how a divorce settlement or judgment should affect a later criminal trial or tort
suit, to the possibility that parallel proceedings might reach conflicting results.
The difficulties raised by dual proceedings argue for some ability to consider
fault in the marriage's dissolution through, for instance, an arbitration
mechanism.2
But the difficulties Michelle catalogues also challenge why policymakers
have stripped fault out of divorce proceedings entirely in roughly a dozen
jurisdictions 3-and why the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution (Principles), published in 2002, would have legislatures
remove fault (other than financial waste) from divorce proceedings
everywhere. This Comment adds three observations to Michelle's astute
analysis: first, that the transaction costs of showing fault may be worth it
financially or emotionally to the party who has been wronged; second, that
deeply unfair results can arise in the absence of an inquiry into fault in the
* Professor of Law and Law Alumni Faculty Fellow, Washington & Lee University
School of Law.
1. Michelle L. Evans, Note, Wrongs CommittedDuringa Marriage: The Child that No
Area of the Law Wants to Adopt, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 465 (2009).
2. See id. at 498-500 (proposing the use of an arbitration proceeding to resolve the issue
of marital misconduct).
3. JOHN DE WiT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 238 (3d ed. 2005).
4. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISsoLuTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 66-67 (LexisNexis 2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES).
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divorce; and third, if we trust judges and juries to determine what is and is not
acceptable behavior in the criminal and civil contexts, then why not trust them
to make similar determinations about fault in the context of family law?
II Choosing Fault in a World of No-Fault Divorce
In thirty jurisdictions in the United States today, a wronged spouse has the
choice about how to proceed with his or her divorce. 5 He or she can sue either
for a no-fault divorce or one that takes fault into consideration in some way. In
some jurisdictions, fault may serve as a ground for divorce6--allowing for a
faster exit from the marriage in some cases. More common, and more relevant
here, fault may be a factor in certain jurisdictions in awarding alimony or
distributing the couple's marital property.8
To understand the deep distrust that some law reformers have of fault, it is
important to understand the impetus for no-fault divorce. Michelle explains
that the availability of no-fault divorce grew in part out of the inability of courts
to sort out after the fact what happened, the desire not to rehash every little
problem in a marriage, and respect for the liberty and autonomy of adults to
leave marriages that are not satisfying to them.9 The movement to recognize
no-fault divorce reflected other concerns as well, concerns about the burdens on
the courts from divorce litigation, as well as the very high transaction costs of
showing fault. 0
Many of the same intuitions that supported no-fault divorce have led law
reform bodies, like the ALI, to aver that the time for fault in divorce
proceedings is past. The Principles, arguably the most sweeping attempt at
family law reform in the last quarter century, would reject any role for fault in
5. Lynn D. Wardle, Beyond Fault and No-Fault in the Reform of Marital Dissolution
Law, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 9, 15 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
6. Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (1985) (listing five grounds for securing a
divorce, four of which involve some degree of fault); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(A) (2008)
(providing four grounds for securing a divorce, three of which involve fault).
7. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-80 (providing a quicker proceeding for divorces based on
desertion or separation).
8. See Wardle, supra note 5, at 15 ("[T]hirty states allow consideration of marital
misconduct in both alimony and property disputes (fifteen states), or in alimony but not property
contests (twenty-two always consider fault in alimony awards and eight rarely do).").
9. See Evans, supra note 1, at 473-76 (discussing the emergence of no-fault divorce).
10. See Laura Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to
Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REv. 607, 611 (1997) (noting that divorce
proceedings were becoming more "'perfunctory' as judges sought to avoid ugly," drawn-out
battles between spouses).
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dissolution proceedings, even if a couple wants to make fault relevant to their
private relationship." 1
The Reporters for the Principles reject a role for fault for a number of
reasons. They reject fault as a device to "punish" the spouse who "caused" the
dissolution, arguing that "[i]n the context of marital failure,... the word
'cause' has no such meaning, and its use simply masks a moral inquiry with a
word pretending a more objective assessment."'12 The Reporters believe that:
[I]t will be the unusual case in which the fairness of the result will be
improved by a judicial inquiry into the relative virtue of the parties'
intimate conduct. In some cases the result will become less fair. And the
rules that invite such misconduct claims will surely increase the cost and
degrade the process in many other cases, even those in which the claim is
ultimately cast aside.' 3
Further, the Reporters contend that considerations of fault can open the door to
"[m]uch mischief' in divorce proceedings. 14 As they explain:
Fault makes the outcome of litigation less predictable, and gives parties an
incentive to raise claims of misconduct as leverage in the negotiation
process. A limited fault rule under which dissolution remedies are forfeited
by serious violence would be less unpredictable in operation, but has its
own difficulties. Because it would provide an incomplete compensation
structure, tort remedies would still be necessary to obtain adequate
compensation for many victims. At the same time it would yield a perverse
pattern in those cases to which it applied, as it apportions penalties whose
harshness increases with the tortfeasor's relative Fpoverty, rather than with
his blameworthiness or the damage he inflicted.'
Fault in divorce is simply unnecessary, the Reporters urge. When
"[o]ffensive conduct in marriage that violates the norms of tort or criminal law
[does occur, it] will normally be actionable whether or not it is the 'cause' of
the actor's marital dissolution."'16 Because a tort remedy is possible, "inviting
additional claims in the dissolution action is a problem, not a solution.'
m7
11. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 54; see also id. § 7.01(4) (making compliance with
the Principles a requirement for enforcement of a prenuptial agreement); id. § 7.08 (providing
that "[a] term in an agreement is not enforceable if... (2) it would require or forbid a court to
evaluate marital conduct in allocating marital property or awarding compensatory payments,
except as the term incorporates principles of state law that so provide").
12. Id. at 50-51.
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Instead, the Reporters would give primacy in financial division and alimony
awards to the marriage's length "in recognition of [the couple's] joint
responsibility for the irreversible personal consequences that arise from
investing many years in the relationship.' 8 In short, the Reporters would punt
considerations of wrongdoing in the marriage to "the tort law and the criminal-
justice system[, which] are designed to serve this purpose [of recourse against
the bad actor], while the law of marital dissolution is not." 19
Michelle ably challenges many of the assumptions underlying these
claims. She questions whether tort suits and criminal prosecutions really can
provide an adequate remedy for the wrongs in a marriage, 20 and here she is
surely right. As any lawyer knows, there is a huge chasm between whether a
wrong is "actionable" and whether any attorney would ever take the victim's
suit on a contingency basis short of the victim dying or suffering severe bodily
injury. Even if some attorney somewhere will bring the suit, Michelle also
persuasively demonstrates how expensive, and messy, it would be for the law to
relegate consideration of the wrongs in a marriage to a tort proceeding.2'
Of equal concern, however, should be the human cost of telling spouses
that wrongs committed in marriage-the most intimate relationship they may
ever have, in which they may be the most vulnerable-simply do not matter to
the dissolution of that relationship. Real people continue, when offered the
opportunity, to plead and prove fault even when a cheaper no-fault exit option
is available. Consider, for example, Christie Brinkley's recent divorce from
Peter Cook.
We learned in their high-profile fault-based divorce proceeding (which
later settled) that Peter Cook had an affair with eighteen-year old Diana
Bianchi, a toy store clerk whom he hired as his personal assistant and soon after
began sleeping with.22 This began a series often to twelve sexual encounters,
some of which occurred "at [Cook's] office, some at Brinkley's homes in the
Hamptons. 23  Bianchi's stepfather, a Long Island policeman, informed
18. Id. at66.
19. Id.
20. See Evans, supra note 1, at 491-96 (evaluating whether tort suits are really an
adequate substitute for the consideration of fault in divorce).
21. See id. at 485-86 (discussing the expenses associated with civil litigation).
22. Louise Roug, Brinkley's Divorce Turns an Idyll into a Spectacle, L.A. TIMES, July 8,
2008, at A7.
23. Mike Celizic, Christie Brinkley's Messy Divorce Trial Goes Nuclear,
TODAYSHOW.COM, July 3, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25509623 (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Brinkley of the affair after a high school commencement speech she delivered
in Southampton, New York.24
Brinkley posited other transgressions by Cook that extend beyond
adultery. At some point, Cook paid Bianchi $300,000 in "hush money."
25
Cook, Brinkley's attorney said, is a "'sex addict' who spent $3,000 a month on
online pornography. 26 He also "masturbated on a Web site [with] a camera on
[him] ... for others to see," something Cook described to Barbara Walters on
20/20 as "quite simply, one-on-one interactive pornography. This was not me
broadcasting a show on a Web site, showing myself to the world. Never my
face, never my name. If it happened, excuse the pun, a handful of times, that's
it."'27 But for Brinkley, the final straw may have come when she learned that
Cook also visited websites designed "to 'connect with people' in their
neighborhood .... 'It was not a voyeur site. It was a meeting site."' 28 She said,
"'It was more than I could bear."' 
29
Now, many of us naturally wonder: "Why would Christie Brinkley want
to air all of this in public?" Certainly, the jurisdiction in which Brinkley and
Cook live, New York, may have played a role. New York is one of the last two
states (along with Mississippi) to prohibit unilateral no-fault divorce. 30 In order
to exit, Brinkley would have to reach an agreement with Cook about the
financial terms for the exit, or she would have to show fault. 31 Certainly, the
fact that sixty to eighty million dollars in property was at stake (putting aside
any prenuptial agreement) may have mattered.32 That Brinkley and Cook have
24. Roug, supra note 22.
25. Christina Boyle, PeterPrinciple AfterDivorce: JAm What JAm, N.Y. DAILYNEWS,
July 13, 2008, at 6.
26. Roug, supra note 22.
27. Kristen Fyfe, Womanizer: 20/20 Sleazes Things Up in the Name of 'News', CULTuRE
& MEDIA INsTITUTE, Oct. 13, 2008, http://www.cultureandmediainstitute.org/articles/2008/
20081013162733.aspx (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. Roug, supra note 22.
29. Id. Claims of "virtual infidelity" are popping up elsewhere as well. William Lee
Adams, UK Couple to Divorce over Affair on Second Life, TIME ONLINE, Nov. 14, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1859231,00.html?imw=Y (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). In November of 2008, Time Online reported that an English
woman sought a divorce after her husband's on-line avatar in the game SecondLife engaged in
sex with a cyber-prostitute and "cuddl[ed] a woman on a sofa." Id. As the woman, Amy Taylor,
explained, "It may have started online, but it existed entirely in the real world and it hurts just as
much." Id.
30. Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Harmonisation of Family Law in the United States, in
EUROPEAN CHALLENGES IN CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 27, 29 (Katharina Boele-Woelki &
Tone Sverdrup eds., 2008).
31. See generally N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2009).
32. Braden Keil & Chuck Bennett, Turf War Set for Christie-Brawl for $80M in
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two minor children, Jack (Cook's stepson) and Sailor Lee (their biological
child), may have played a role; Brinkley sought (and later received) primary
custody.33 Of course, Brinkley and Cook could have privately settled their
financial affairs and (subject to the court's oversight) even the question of
custody, but they chose to litigate.34 Now, it is possible that Cook and Brinkley
could not come to reasonable terms in light of these facts. But it could also
be-as some of the media coverage suggests-that Brinkley was "absolutely
furious" about what happened and she wanted the world to know how Peter
Cook had wronged her.35
What could Brinkley have possibly gained? Others have argued that fault
can have salutary effects.36 When fault is no longer an issue in divorce
proceedings, it may turn "open and direct conflict" into the "disguised or
indirect" type.3 Because some divorces remain acrimonious, squeezing out
fault merely transfers hostility from "marital fault to child custody," resulting in
"emotional damage [being] inflicted on [the] innocent and impressionable." 38
This transfer may shift the strategic or dishonest behavior that historically
centered on the grounds for divorce to child custody or visitation issues (which
some believe may explain the increase in child sexual abuse allegations).39
Hence, in the absence of fault, "[ilt is much more problematic for courts and
lawyers to deal indirectly with phantom factors than to deal directly and openly
with factors that drive the parties and their litigation."40
Brinkley's choice to pursue fault at the risk of public humiliation and
considerable expense may illuminate the findings in a recent empirical study of
the Principles that I co-authored. The study examined how the Principles have
been received by legislatures and courts from the project's inception in the
early 1990s through May 2008, eight years after their adoption. 41  The
Property, N.Y. POST, July 7, 2008, at 7.
33. Christina Boyle et al., How Sweet It Is for Christie, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 11, 2008,
at7.
34. Selim Algar, The Other Other Woman, N.Y. POST, July 1, 2008, at 3.
35. Celizic, supra note 23. Others may give Brinkley's choice to sue for fault a different
valence. As Cook's attorney put it, she wanted him "flogged in public." Id.
36. See Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L.
REv. 79, 119-20 (arguing that "[m]odern no-fault divorce laws fail to balance marriage stability
goals with divorce facilitation policy, portray a defective model of marriage, and inadequately
provide for the public consequences of private choices").
37. Id. at 101.
38. Id. at 100-01.
39. Id. at 105.
40. Wardle, supra note 5, at 17.
41. See generally Michael R. Clisham & Robin Fretwell Wilson, American Law
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staggering finding over those eighteen years was that not a single legislature has
indicated that it has followed the Principles' recommendation that fault should
be removed entirely from divorce.42 This is ironic since the Principles
themselves are directed at "rulemakers" who have had eight years to latch onto
the idea.43
Neither has a single court cited Chapter 1 of the Principles where the plea
appears to remove fault (other than financial waste) entirely from divorce.
44
This is a remarkable omission because the Principles have been cited by courts
in over one hundred discrete cases across twenty-seven jurisdictions since
1990.45 So while the Principles' recommendations on alimony, child support,
and property division are having some influence with courts, the Reporters'
argument that fault has no role to play has not.
III. Grave Injustices
One place where I part ways with Michelle's thesis is the implicit
assumption she makes that bad actors in a marriage should not be completely
wiped out as a result of their bad act.46 For example, in the famous case where
Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding
Principles or Obligatory Footnote?, 42 FAM. L.Q. 573 (2008).
42. See id. at 576 ("Although one state, West Virginia, borrowed from the Principles in
enacting child custody legislation, no other state code or legislation enacted since 1990
referencing the Principles was found .... [I]f legislatures are borrowing from the Principles,
they are certainly not tipping their hands.").
43. See Ira Mark Ellman, Chief Reporter's Foreword to ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4
("Other sections, however, are addressed to rulemakers rather than decisionmakers."). By
contrast, non-governmental groups have followed the Principles' recommendations on fault.
On March 9, 2007, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML) published its
report on Considerations when Determining Alimony, Spousal Support or Maintenance, which
"critically review[ed] the [Principles] to analyze the Principles and to make recommendations
consistent with the mission of the Academy." American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers,
Considerations when Determining Alimony, Spousal Support or Maintenance (Mar. 9,2007),
http://www.aaml.org/i4a/pages/index.cfin?pageid=3739 (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). The AAML ultimately adopted a "formula" for determining alimony that uses the
"two factors that are considerations in virtually all jurisdictions-income of the parties and the
length of the marriage." Id, The AAML recognizes "that the amount arrived at may not always
reflect the unique circumstances of the parties" and so provided "deviation factors ... to address
the more common situations where an adjustment would need to be made." Id. Fault is not an
explicit ground for deviation, although "[o]ther circumstances that make application of these
considerations inequitable" is a ground for deviation. Id.
44. Clisham & Wilson, supra note 41, at 604.
45. See id. at 609 (noting that the combined results from searches using Westlaw and
Lexis yielded a total universe of one hundred cases).
46. See Evans, supra note 1, at 491 ("An equitable distribution of property that considers
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Aftab Islam beat his wife Theresa brutally with a barbell, requiring her to have
hundreds of thousands of dollars of reconstructive surgery,47 Michelle worries
that a tort suit could leave the husband destitute. 5
For her, an arbitration award, imported back into the divorce proceeding,
would be preferable because it would reduce "the danger of leaving the
tortfeasor completely insolvent. 4 9 Yet she acknowledges that if the same man
beat a fellow drinker in a bar until he was unrecognizable, he could be wiped
out financially.50 Indeed, the standard for punitive damages is the amount that
it will take to deter that conduct in the future. As Michelle recognizes, and as
these examples make clear, we often receive less protection in our homes and in
our most intimate of relationships than we would receive mingling with
strangers at a bar.5
Michelle tackles something that is almost always missed in the discussion
about fault: The problem of the lesser-earning tortfeasor.52 Many people seem
to assume that it is the higher-earning partner who beats his wife or steps out on
her. Yet, the Brinkley case shows that often times it is the wealthier spouse
who is wronged but still has a lot to lose upon dissolution. Consider Brinkley's
settlement with Cook. Brinkley agreed to give Cook $2.1 million, a substantial
sum, although most of it likely "will end up in his lawyers' pockets. 5 3 Cook
had to surrender Sweet Freedom, "the little fishing boat Brinkley gave him on
his 40th birthday," but will receive some proceeds of the vessel's sale.5
4
Brinkley kept eighteen properties she purchased during the marriage, which
"real estate brokers say are worth between $60 and $80 million."55
fault can more adequately balance the compensatory purpose with the desire to leave both
parties above subsistence levels when feasible.").
47. Tara Bahrampour, Unusual Divorce Case Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2001, at B5.
48. Evans, supra note 1, at 490-91 ("[A] damages award in tort, ifrecoverable, may leave
the guilty party in poverty.").
49. Id. at 499.
50. See id. at 490-91 (recognizing that an independent tort suit has the potential to
financially destroy a defendant).
51. See id. at 491 (identifying that spouses face barriers in bringing tort actions that are
not present in suits between others).
52. Id. at 489-91.
53. Boyle et al., supra note 33.
54. Id.
55. Keil & Bennett, supra note 32. Brinkley also received sole custody and
decisionmaking power for the children, Jack and Sailor Lee, while Cook retained his visitation
rights, which consisted of"every other weekend and one school night a week with extra time in
the summer." Boyle et al., supra note 33.
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One question some may ask is why Peter Cook gets anything. How is it
that he can walk away with $2.1 million? For that matter, how is it that one can
beat one's wife to the point where she requires extensive reconstructive surgery
and walk away with anything?
As Michelle notes, divorce proceedings are inherently concerned with
equity, necessarily relying on judges to get these questions right.56 In a case
that followed the famous barbell case, a woman, Mrs. DeSilva, was married to
a man who drank heavily and abused her, the abuse increasing in frequency and
intensity over time.57 She made $100,000 per year and he made $45,000
annually, making him a prime candidate in some jurisdictions for alimony.
58
Upon divorce, the court awarded her 100% of all the assets, possession of the
marital home where she would live with their minor children, and split their
substantial debt, with 92% going to the husband and 8% to the abused wife.59
In other words, he was wiped out. This man breached the trust of the marriage
by beating his wife, and many would say Cook breached the trust of the
marriage by cheating on Brinkley. Yet both weaker-earning spouses wanted to
get paid. The DeSilva court, at least, refused to reward the husband.
It can be hard to grasp what we are doing when we apportion property and
award alimony at the end of a marriage. Sometimes it is to compensate for lost
opportunity6°-in the classic case, the wife who puts her career on hold to care
for children. Sometimes it is to respond to need,61 and sometimes it is to give
each spouse a share of the wealth they together earned during the marriage.62
But had Cook not cheated and had DeSilva not abused his wife, neither would
need to have the wealth divided or to receive alimony because the marriage
presumably would have continued. So both in the end have breached their
spouse's trust and want to get paid.
56. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMEsTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 2.1, at 24 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining that American family law started out in the law of equity);
J. Thomas Oldham, Changes in the Economic Consequences of Divorces, 1958-2008,42 FAM.
L.Q. 419, 427 (2008) ("In the last few decades, it became accepted in all states that a divorce
court has the power to divide some or all of the spouses' property, and this routinely occurs in
divorces today if the parties have property to divide.").
57. See DeSilva v. DeSilva, No. 350818/05,2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2489, at *1-4 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 2006).
58. Id. at *6.
59. Id. at *6-7.
60. See CLARK, supra note 56, § 16.4, at 655 ("In addition to the factors already
mentioned, courts also take into account in awarding alimony such considerations as ... what
the wife gave up when she married the husband.").
61. Id. § 16.4, at 647-49.
62. Id. § 16.4, at 655.
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Of course, because domestic violence is beyond the bounds of decency in
any civil society, few are likely to be distressed if Mr. DeSilva is wiped out
financially. This is likely not so with adultery, which poses a much thornier set
of questions. If the law sanctioned adultery as harshly as it did Mr. DeSilva's
domestic violence-wiping out adulterers financially-this could create
incentives for the offending spouse to continue in the marriage to avoid the
potential penalty of fault divorce. At some point, the penalty could become so
high that people feel compelled to remain in a failing marriage lest they become
insolvent. Fault in this instance could still be considered, not as a mechanism
for financially wiping out the adulterer, but as grounds for departure from the
presumptive division of marital property that would have occurred in the
absence of adultery-for example, in the classic long-term marriage, grounds
for departing from a 50/50 split. This disincentive to adultery would not
trample on anyone's sexual liberty. The spouse who wants to be a "player" can
always obtain a divorce on a no-fault basis before taking on new sexual
partners, thereby avoiding the financial penalty entirely.
IV. ALl Principles: A Satisfactory Solution?
The primary impetus behind the Reporters' argument that we should
eradicate fault from divorce is to avoid "a judicial inquiry into the relative
virtue of the parties' intimate conduct."63 Moral judgments are ultimately
unnecessary in divorce because "[o]ffensive conduct in marriage that violates
the norms of tort or criminal law will normally be actionable whether or not it is
the 'cause' of the actor's marital dissolution."64 Punishment and compensation
rationales both fail in the Reporters' view.65 Under the compensation rationale,
the idea is that a "fault-based award is justified because it allocates more of
those costs to the spouse whose conduct caused them, by causing the
dissolution. "66
The Reporters see this as a dishonest exercise, a "sleight of hand,, 67 that
masks moral judgments. As they explain:
The problem is... being able to establish which spouse "caused" the
dissolution. Inquiring into the cause of marital dissolution is different from
inquiring into the cause of chicken pox, or of a plumbing failure. In those
63. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 66-67.
64. Id. at 51.
65. Id. at 49-52.
66. Id. at 54.
67. Id.
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contexts the word "cause" has an objective meaning; it is a prior event
(such as infection, or rust) without which the later event would not have
occurred. In the context of marital failure, however, the word "cause" has
no such meaning, and its use simply masks a moral inquiry with a word
pretending a more objective assessment. Some individuals tolerate their
spouse's drunkenness or adultery and remain in their marriage. Others may
seek divorce if their spouse grows fat, or spends long hours at the office. Is
the divorce "caused" by one spouse's offensive conduct, or by the other's
unreasonable intolerance? In deciding that question the court is assessing
the parties' relative moral failings, not the relationship between
independent and dependent variables. And the complexity of marital
relations of course confounds the inquiry. The fading of affective ties
makes spouses less tolerant of one another. So determining the "cause" of a
marital failure requires establishing the reason for the loss of affection.
68
This is problematic for the Reporters because:
[B]y dressing up [a court's] conclusion in the neutral language of causation,
the court can assign such blame without identifying the standards under
which it does so. Much mischief can result from allowing courts to assign
liability to nontortious conduct by application of unarticulated-and
effectively unreviewable--standards of blameworthiness. 69
In other words, the Reporters are saying we cannot know what precipitated the
end of the marriage and making moral judgments about these acts-
drunkenness, adultery, the loss of affection-is a dangerous undertaking.
The problem with this stance is that it takes as an article of faith that
egregious conduct in the marriage will be actionable in tort or criminal law.
Michelle persuasively argues that tort remedies cannot always compensate the
wronged party, especially when the wrongdoer has few, if any, assets or
income. 70  Neither can criminal law always respond to marital wrongs.
Prosecutors frequently choose not to prosecute domestic violence cases for a
variety of reasons. 7 Moreover, it would be remarkable indeed to see criminal
adultery prohibitions enforced.7 2  In the absence of these other remedies,
68. Id.
69. Id. at 55.
70. See Evans, supra note 1, at 490 (discussing the danger that "the tortfeasor may
squander his or her portion of the marital property, or creditors may make claims against those
funds before a tort suit can be resolved and a damage award issued").
71. See, e.g., Donna Willis, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 173, 176 (1997) (arguing that the victim's unwillingness to press charges
is one reason "prosecutors traditionally are reluctant to charge batterers").
72. See RiCHARD A. POSNER & KATHERINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUWE TO AMERICA'S SEX
LAwS 103 (1996) ("As with fornication, it is commonly thought that adultery charges are never
prosecuted. This is true to a great extent, but exceptions persist.").
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divorce proceedings without fault would treat all conduct that contributed to the
end of a marriage alike-whether it is loss of affection or beating another
person with a barbell. Acts beyond the bounds of decency simply become
irrelevant.
For the Reporters, this is not a bad result. They believe we simply cannot
trust judges to make these calls.73 By contrast, I think, as the DeSilva case
shows, we can trust the courts to figure out which acts should be beyond the
bounds of decency in an intimate relationship. Indeed, judges and juries
frequently make those calls in the criminal and tort contexts, and I think we can
trust family court judges to make them too.
Not only can we trust judges to separate egregious wrongs from piddly
transgressions, I believe we can rely on the victims of egregious conduct to
decide for themselves whether they want to air their dirty laundry and bear the
transaction costs of showing that the other party violated "minimum standards
of decency [in a] marriage"4---or whether they want simply to agree to a no-
fault divorce. At least today they have the choice.
73. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 50 ("[The moral standards by which
blameworthy conduct will be identified and punished will vary from judge to judge, as each
judge necessarily relies on his or her own vision of appropriate behavior in intimate
relationships.").
74. Evans, supra note 1, at 497.
